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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is about a black foster family who became em-
broiled in a custody modification dispute in Minnesota.' It is also
about Minnesota Statute section 518.185 and how Minnesota's ap-
pellate courts have interpreted, reinterpreted, and sometimes rede-
fined portions of this statute out of existence. The statute in rele-
vant part reads as follows:
A party seeking... modification of a custody order shall
submit together with moving papers an affidavit setting
forth facts supporting the... modification and shall give
notice, together with a copy of the affidavit, to other par-
ties to the proceeding, who may file opposing affidavits.
The statute contains no procedural guidance other than to al-
low the parties to submit sworn affidavits in support of, or in oppo-
sition to, a custody modification motion.3 Without specific statu-
t Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law
1. This was a pro bono case handled by the author.
2. MINN. STAT. § 518.185 (1998).
3. See id. See generally ROBERT E. OLIPHANT, MINNESOTA FAMILY LAW PRIMER
§ 32 (4th ed. 1992) (providing a comprehensive discussion on child modification
laws in Minnesota).
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tory guidance, the preliminary decision to order or deny a full cus-
tody hearing turns entirely on the weight a trial judge gives to the
information provided in affidavits submitted by the parties.
Under present Minnesota law, a full custody hearing is or-
dered if the trial judge concludes that prima facie evidence shows
that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the
parties, and that the modification is necessary to serve the best in-
terests of the child.5 This prima facie evidence consists of facts that
have arisen since the prior child custodKY order or facts unknown to
the court at the time of the prior order.
In rare cases, the moving party's affidavit may contain infor-
mation such as police or child protection reports that negate the
claim that custody should be modified. Nevertheless, some trial
court judges have disregarded the contrary information and or-
7dered full custody hearings.
The procedural vacuum left by the statute and two decades of
creative interpretation of it by various Minnesota appellate panels
has created a perplexing situation for lawyers and judges faced with
assessing whether a modification request should or will proceed.
The uncertainty makes it difficult at this critical juncture of a modi-
fication dispute to predict with any degree of accuracy the weight a
court will give to competing information before it. Furthermore,
because trial judges have not received clear procedural guidance
from the appellate courts, they may render inconsistent rulings.
The thesis of this article is that Minnesota's legal system has
done a poor job of explaining and applying Minnesota Statute sec-
tion 518.185. First, the appellate courts have failed to adhere to
the original legislative purpose of Minnesota Statute section
518.185, which is found in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
4. See Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (stating
that a court has broad discretion in custody matters).
5. See MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (1998). In applying these standards the court
shall retain the custody arrangement established by the prior order, unless "the
child's present environment endangers the child's emotional development and
the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the ad-
vantage of a change to the child." Id. In this dispute, prima facie evidence of im-
proper touching of a sexual nature comes within the scope of this provision. See
Francis v Francis, No. C3-97-1569, 1998 WL 61992, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 17,
1998) (holding prima facie evidence established that mother's new husband was
convicted of child molestation).
6. See MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d).
7. See Chafin v. Rude, 391 N.W.2d 882, 885-86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
[Vol. 26:3
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(UMDA), s and calls for a restrictive view of ordering modification
hearings.9 Second, there is no evident explanation for the judicial
system's decision to abandon the UMDA philosophy. Third, con-
tradictory views expressed by various appellate panels about how to
view competing affidavits have created uncertainty and confusion
engulfing this area of the law.
This article's conclusion contains suggestions for change. If
adopted, the changes will help bring greater certainty and uniform-
ity to the decision making process at the initial stage of a custody
modification dispute and restore the original purpose of the legis-
lation to Minnesota law.
II. THE MODIFICATION DISPUTE
As noted earlier, the catalyst for this article involved a black
foster family and their custody dispute while living in a predomi-
nantly white, affluent suburb in the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and
St. Paul, Minnesota. The husband and wife were experienced fos-
ter parents who had parented minority children for more than a
dozen years. Many of the children placed with them had gone on
to become successful, outstanding and contributing citizens in the
community. A few, unfortunately, were unable to shed the prob-
lems that first brought them into foster care.
The dispute was heart wrenching. In the middle, stood a
twelve-year-old female child whose legal and physical custody ° was
taken from her biological mother five years earlier and placed with
the foster family.' The child's biological mother is a twice-
convicted sex offender whose crimes involved minor children. The
child's biological father's rights were terminated after he aban-
doned her.
When the court issued the original order placing the child's
physical and legal custody with the black foster parents, it con-
tained a provision that permitted, albeit encouraged, occasional
8. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §§ 101-506,9AU.L.A. 171 (1998).
9. SeeUNIW. MARRIAGEAND DIVORCEAcr § 410, 9A U.L.A. 538-39 (1998).
10. "Legal Custody means [having] the right to determine the child's up-
bringing, including education, health care and religious training." 14 MARTIN L.
SWADEN & LINDA A. OLUP, MINNESOTA PRACTICE § 6.3 (1992). "Physical Custody
designates who provides the routine daily care, control and residence of the
child." JEANETrE A. FREDRICKSON, THE MINNESOTA DIVORCE REVOLUTION 31 (2d ed.
1995).
11. The foster family received sole physical and legal custody of the child,
who was almost seven years old at the time.
20001
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contact between the child and her biological family. Despite the
foster family's concern about continuing contact with the biological
mother, she was allowed occasional, supervised visits. The child was
also allowed to visit other blood relatives, some of whom resided
outside the state. 2
During the five years the child lived with the foster family, she
became an integral part of it. The environment was stable, loving
and disciplined. Doctor and dental appointments were kept,
school and church attendance became important, and the child,
although troubled, grew.
During the spring of the child's fifth year of residence with the
foster family, the child's blood relatives began to pressure the foster
family to transfer custody to an aunt13 By this time the foster family
had formed a natural bond of parental affection with the child and
treated her as though she was their natural issue. In addition, the
family was extremely concerned that a transfer of custody to the
aunt would significantly increase the chances for unsupervised con-
tact with the biological mother. The foster family adamantly re-
jected the transfer requests. Unknown to the foster family, the
child apparently fell under the influence of her blood relatives and
began to formulate a plan to join them.
14
In the early summer of the fifth year, the child's biological
mother lodged a complaint with local authorities. She asserted that
the child informed her during a telephone conversation that on
one recent occasion her foster father inappropriately touched her.
Upon receiving the complaint, and without warning to the foster
family, the child protection unit assisted by the local police, imme-
diately seized and removed the child from the home. Simultane-
ously, child protection removed the foster family's own children
from the home.
The foster parents were stunned and shaken by the seizure of
the children, all of who were put in temporary shelters. They were
baffled by the allegation regarding inappropriate touching.
The local authorities initiated an aggressive investigation into
the allegation. They interviewed the child, the foster family's chil-
12. It was apparently the view of the social workers assigned to the case that
this was in the best interests of the child.
13. Of interest may be the fact that five years earlier the aunt was given the
opportunity to take custody of the child but refused.
14. Notes and writings in the child's handwriting, which were subsequently
obtained by investigators, confirmed this fact.
[Vol. 26:3
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dren, the foster parents, and others. After a month-long inquiry by
all relevant agencies, they unanimously concluded that the allega-
tion could not be substantiated. With tears ofjoy the foster parents
welcomed the children back home.
However, the official investigation and return of the children
to the foster family did not end the matter. Four weeks after the
authorities closed the case, the biological mother filed legal papers
in juvenile court and served them on the foster family demanding
the foster family transfer the child's custody to the out-of-state aunt.
However, shortly after the filing, the juvenile court dismissed the
action stating it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the dis-
pute.
The foster family's legal nightmare had not yet ended. Ap-
proximately two weeks following the juvenile court dismissal, a new
modification motion was served on the foster family, this time ve-
nued in family court. The basis for the proposed custody change,
according to the motion, was the allegation of inappropriate touch-
ing, originally reported to authorities by the biological mother.
The biological mother attached, and therefore incorporated to the
affidavit, copies of relevant investigative reports prepared by local
authorities. In her motion the biological mother conceded that
the police, child protection and the local county attorney's office
had concluded that the touching claim could not be substantiated.
Moreover, the motion failed to explain or suggest that the original
investigation was deficient. It also did not suggest that any "new"
evidence had come to light supporting the motion.
In response to the motion, the foster family prepared affidavits
that explained the circumstances surrounding the false allegation.
The foster family informed the court that the child, in a confused
and immature effort to satisfy what she perceived as demands that
she live with her blood relatives, had fabricated the allegation. The
foster family also stated that the child had recanted her story to
third parties.
With this information before it, the matter came on for a hear-
ing to determine whether a trial-like, full custody evidentiary hear-
ing should be held. To the surprise and dismay of the foster family,
the trial judge ruled that the biological mother's affidavits were
"sufficient for purposes of going forward with an evidentiary hear-
ing on the motion."
Of possible interest is the fact that the trial judge, in her order,
briefly alluded to the contrary factual information contained in the
20001
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foster family's documents and the material that explained the false
allegation in the responsive affidavits. There was nothing, however,
to indicate that the judge did anything more than to narrowly as-
sume the allegation in the moving party's affidavit was true and or-
der a full custody hearing. The foster family was once again
stunned by the legal system's decision.
III. THE HIGH COST OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
The financial and psychological impact on a custodial family
when a full custody hearing is ordered is enormous and devastating
to the child in the middle of the dispute. 5 The family must scram-
ble to find sufficient financial resources to support the legal battle
it is being forced to undergo. A second and possibly third mort-
gage on the family home may be the only avenue open to cover the
legal costs. In addition, the custodial family and the child whose
custody is in doubt may suffer psychologically as they attempt to
maintain balance in their relationship while the custody modifica-
tion war swirls around them. In some cases the relationship be-
tween the child and all of the adults involved in the custody war
may forever be scarred.
For a lawyer, getting ready for a full custody modification hear-
ing is little different from preparing for trial. Depositions must be
taken and fees associated with court reporters that record and tran-
scribe the depositions paid. Because the psychological character of
the participants usually needs exposure by experts, psychologists,
psychiatrists, and other mental health workers must be employed to
provide this testimony.16  Teachers, the family doctor, dentist,
neighbors and the family's clergy must be contacted and statements
15.
Children... react even to temporary infringement of parental autonomy
with anxiety, diminishing trust, loosening of emotional ties, or an increas-
ing tendency to be out of control.... [A]t no stage should intrusion on
any family [which the author defines as conducting a hearing] be author-
ized unless probable cause for the coercive action has been established in
accord with limits prospectively and precisely defined by the legislature.
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET. AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 25 (1979).
16. See Alison Richey McBurney, Note, Bitter Battles: The Use Of Psychological
Evaluations In Child Custody Disputes In West Virginia, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 773, 778-82
(1995); see also RexJulian Beaber, Custody Quagmire: Some Psycholegal Dilemmas, 10J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 309, 313 (1982) (stating that parents are skilled at misrepresent-
ing facts to accomplish their goals).
[Vol. 26:3
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obtained from them.17
Adequate trial preparation takes time, which only adds to the
financial and psychological anxiety experienced by the custodial
family. Witness fees, subpoena and service costs all are added to
the expenses associated with the custody war. If a guardian ad litem
is ordered, which is customary where allegations of abuse are made,
the guardian's expenses will have to be paid." Tension among
family members mounts as the family's financial resources dwin-
dle.19
The psychological strain during the weeks leading to the full
custody hearing can be enormous. During depositions the contest-
ants may glare at each other while exchanging subtle, angry looks
and gestures. Their actions telegraph the message that they are
prepared to "fight" to the bitter end over who is going to continue
raising the child whose custody is in issue.
The costs may never seem to end, especially to a custodial par-
ent who has solidly bonded with a minor child. After the decision
following the full custody modification hearing, should it be ad-
verse to the custodian, there is likely to be an appeal. If the court
of appeals finds against the bonded custodian, there is often a peti-
tion to the Minnesota Supreme Court for review. All of the legal
maneuvering is costly and delays only increase the uncertainty
prevalent in a custody battle. 2' During the process families and
friends may turn against each other as alliances are formed and
battle lines drawn; the normal family life of the child over whom
17. Parenthetically, it appears that in many of these disputes neither party has
sufficient financial resources to support a full-fledged custody battle. The result is
that the matter proceeds without the extensive, serious investigation needed to get
at the truth of the allegations and to provide a platform for an informed decision
by the trial judge.
18. In Minnesota, it is apparently common practice for the guardian ad litem's
expenses to be shared on a 50/50 basis.
19. The litigation costs associated with effectively meeting a custody modifica-
tion hearing may well reduce the standard of living of a custodial family. See gener-
ally LENOREJ. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 339 (1985) (stat-
ing that women experience a 73% decline in their post-divorce standard of living).
20. SeeJohnson v. Smith, 374 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (hold-
ing that the trial court erred by removing child from custodial parent where it
failed to properly account for the fact that the child had been with that parent for
eight years).
21. The legal maneuvering delays for child custody modifications are repre-
sented by Autenreith v. Terrazas, No. CX-96-2482, 1997 WL 309414, at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. June 10, 1997), where the time from motion to modify through review
denial by the Supreme Court, extended to 15months.
2000]
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they struggle may well be shattered.
The child may understand little about the struggle other than
that the contestants are bitingly hostile to each other. Caught in
the middle of the furor, a child may become confused, depressed,
or angry.22 The child may view all sides as hating each other, even
though the contestants may in the future make an effort never to
say negative things about the custodian again.23 There is little that
could be more disruptive to the continuity and stability of a child's
environment than a modification hearing.24 There is nothing in
the American legal system that could be more destructive to a cus-
todial foster family than such a hearing.
IV. STATUTORY INTENT
Minnesota Statute section 518.185 was passed into law by the
1978 Minnesota Legislature and became effective March 1, 1979.25
The statute was amended in 1986 to remove all nonsubstantive
gender specific references contained in it.26  No substantive
changes have been made in the statute since it became effective.
The Minnesota Supreme Court provides a starting point for
27analysis of the statute in Nice-Petersen v. Nice-Petersen, where it said
that the provision is "consistent with section 410 of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, from which section 518.185 was largely
taken. 28 If one agrees with this observation, then an understand-
22. "It is clear from the psychological literature that a lawsuit over visitation
rights, with its accompanying intrusions by psychological experts and lawyers and
its inevitable disruption of the... family, often creates extreme anxiety and dislo-
cation for the child." Judith L. Shandling, Note, The Constitutional Constraints on
Grandparents' Visitation Statutes, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 118, 124 (1986) (citations omit-
ted).
23. See generally Andrew S. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Cus-
tody Following Divorce, 21 SRACUSE L. REV. 55, 58, 60-61 (1969) (discussing the im-
pact of the custody process on the children involved).
24. See GoLDsTErN ET. AL., supra note 15, at 31-35 (1973); see also Hummel v.
Hummel, 304 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. 1981) (stating that such hearings have a "dis-
ruptive impact" on minor children).
25. See 1978 Minn. Laws, ch. 772, § 45 (1979).
26. See § 518.85, amended by Laws 1986, c. 444.
27. 310 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981); see also MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1992) (stat-
ing that in construing statutes, courts must ascertain and give effect to the legisla-
ture's intention).
28. Nice-Petersen, 310 N.W.2d at 472; see also Chris Ford, Untying the Relocation
Knot: Recent Developments and a Model for Change, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 50
(1997) (stating that the Minnesota UMDA version parallels the original UMDA
Act); Laura Beresh Taylor, Note, C.R.B. v. C.C. and B.C.: Protecting Children's Need
[Vol. 26:3
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ing of the philosophy of UMDA is important to a proper applica-
tion of Minnesota's statute in concrete disputes.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved section 410 of the UMDA in 1970 and amended by
that body in 1971 and 1973.2 The philosophy of the UMDA re-
garding custody modification is unambiguous. The statute portrays
the conviction that finality in custody decrees is of the utmost im-
portance and it places a premium on stabilitys° and continuity in a
child's life.
3'
The UMDA sought to discourage noncustodians from punish-
ing or manipulating the custodian by the use of frequent modifica-
32tion motions. It took the standard best interest test that existed inmost jurisdictions at the time and tightened the test considerably,33
For Stability In Custody Modification Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third Par-
ties, 32 AKRON L. REv. 371, 379 n.45 (1999) (listing Kentucky, Illinois, Arizona, and
Washington as states that has adopted portions of UMDA provisions); C. Gail Vast-
erling, Child Custody Modification Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: A Stat-
ute to End the Tug-of-War?, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 923, 936 n.74 (1989) (listing the fol-
lowing as states that, at the time, had maintained statutes containing versions of
the UMDA modification provision: Colorado, Delaware, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Montana, Ohio, Washington).
29. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORcE Acr §§ 101-506, 9A Refs & Annos. 159
(1998 & Supp. 1999). Several states have adopted the UMDA statute. See ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-401 to 25-414 (West 2000) (renumbered from 25-331 to 25-
340.1); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-113 and §§ 14-10-101 to 14-10-
133 (West 1997); 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/101-5/802 (West 1999); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 403.010-403.350 (Michie 1999); MINN. STAT. § 518.18 (1998); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 452.300-452.415 (West 1997); WASH. REv. CODEANN. §§ 26.09.002-
26.09.914 (West 1997). Other jurisdictions may well have been influenced by
those states. See Kathleen Nemechek, Note, Child Preference in Custody Decisions:
Where We Have Been, Where We are Now, Where We Should Go, 83 IOwA L. REv. 437, 444
(1998) (describing the different approaches for adopting the UMDA).
30. SeeJoan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94
YALE LJ. 757, 774 (1985) (noting the importance of ensuring the finality of cus-
tody decrees to promote the child's interests); see also Erhardt v. Erhardt, 554 P.2d
758, 759 (Mont. 1976) ("[L]egislative intent [is] to provide some stability for cus-
tody arrangements.").
31. See UNEF. MARRIAGE & DIvORCE ACT § 409, 9A U.L.A. 439 cmt. (1998).
32. See id.
33. The UMDA standard provides:
[T] he court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it finds, upon
the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were un-
known to the court at the time of the entry of the prior decree, that a
change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian,
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declaring, for example, that the movant must show by affidavit
"that there is reason to believe the child's present environment may
endanger seriously his physical, mental, moral, or emotional
health. It required that courts find, before ordering any change
in custody, "the harm likely to be caused by a chanFe of environ-
ment is outweighed by its advantages to [the child]."'
Repeatedly, one finds in the UMDA a determination to pre-
vent litigation over a child. Minnesota modeled Minnesota Statute
section 518.185 after section 410 of the UMDA, 6 and absent local
legislative history to the contrary, Minnesota's treatment of this
statute should be consistent with the UMDA. Unfortunately, that is
not the case.
For example, nothing in the UMDA suggests a noncustodian
need only meet the minimal prima facie burden standard to gain a
full hearing. 7 Furthermore, nothing in the UMDA suggests a trial
judge should assume the truth of one party's claims while ignoring
or failing to weigh the opponent's response.
Unfortunately, either the Minnesota legislature and courts
never understood or, if they did understand, they have abandoned
the UMDA philosophy regarding custody modification. As dis-
cussed more fully in the next section, the result is that Minnesota
has vested almost unchecked power in the trial court over the deci-
sion whether to order a full custody hearing and has maximized the
Id. § 409(b), 9A U.L.A. 439 (1998). This is a restatement of the traditional best
interests test. See also Wexler, supra note 30, at 774. In the next sentence, how-
ever, significant new limitations were added:
In applying these standards the court shall retain the custodian ap-
pointed pursuant to the prior decree unless:
(1) the custodian agrees to the modification;
(2) the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with
consent of the custodian; or
(3) the child's present environment endangers seriously his physical,
mental, moral, or emotional health, and the harm likely to be caused by
a change of environment is outweighed by its advantages to him.
UNI. MARRIAGE & DIvORcE Acr § 409(b) (1)-(3), 9A U.L.A. 439. The Act also pro-
vides that attorneys' fees and costs shall be assessed against a party seeking modifi-
cation if the court finds that the modification action is vexatious and constitutes
harassment. See id. § 409(c), 9A U.L.A. 439.
34. UNIF. MARRIAGE& DIvoRcEAct § 409(a), 9A U.L.A. 439.
35. Id. § 409(b)(3) 9 U.L.A. 439 (1998).
36. See Nice-Peterson v. Nice-Peterson, 310 N.W.2d 471,471 (Minn. 1981).
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potential for manipulation by the noncustodian, especially where
vague sex abuse claims are made. Noncustodians are fully aware
that for some judges a single claim of improper sexual contact will
probably trigger a full custody hearing, regardless of the response
from the custodian. This is not what the drafters of the UMDA in-
tended.
V. COMMON LAW STANDARDS EMERGE
One of its principles, says the Minnesota Supreme Court, is
"where language used is clear, explicit, and unambiguous.. . the
courts must give [the statute] the ordinary meaning of the words
used." It has also said, "if the language of the provision is unam-
biguous, it must be given its literal meaning-there is neither the
opportunity nor the responsibility to engage in creative construc-
tion."39 Unfortunately, these principles have sometimes eluded the
Minnesota court system when it has considered Minnesota Statute
section 518.185. The result is ajudicial system that has pretty much
abandoned the original intent of the statute and a series of com-
mon law rulings that are difficult, if not possible, to reconcile. This
has left the law in the area uncertain, confusing, and without a
clear purpose.4°
When in September 1981, Minnesota's Supreme Court exam-
ined Minnesota Statute section 518.185 in Nice-Peterson v. Nice-
38. Gardner v. Holm, 241 Minn. 125, 129, 62 N.W.2d 52,55 (1954).
39. Rice v. Connolly, 488 N.W.2d 241, 247 (Minn. 1992). See, e.g., Village of
McKinley v. Waldor, 284 Minn. 394, 399, 170 N.W.2d 430, 433 (1969).
40. Minnesota's appellate courts have also been plagued with uncertainty
over the question of the correct standard of review. The courts have applied an
abuse of discretion standard to a district court's dismissal of a modification peti-
tion without an evidentiary hearing, stating that the appellate court is relying on
the trial court's general broad discretion in custody matters. See Geibe v. Geibe,
571 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). Compare Ross v. Ross, 477 N.W.2d
753, 755-56 (Minn. Ct. App.1991) (applying de novo standard), with Geibe, 571
N.W.2d at 777-78 (discussing Ross but applying abuse of discretion standard). Ross
held that a de novo standard was applicable because, when deciding whether to
hold an evidentiary hearing, the district court does not make findings of fact and,
as a result, "there is no occasion... for deference to trial court assessment of con-
flicting evidence." Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 755. Geibe notes that post-Ross decisions
have used an abuse of discretion standard and also notes that Ross did not address
the use of the abuse of discretion standard used in Nice-Petersen. See Geibe, 571
N.W.2d at 778. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has not explicitly re-
solved this discrepancy, it has applied an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing
whether a district court properly denied a request for an evidentiary hearing. See
Valentine v. Lutz, 512 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Minn. 1994).
2000]
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Peterson, it conceded that the statute as enacted is consistent with
section 410 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.41 Unfortu-
nately, the court failed in the opinion to share the unambiguous
41
philosophical basis supporting the statute found in the UMDA .
Rather, it left open for future common law rulings the question of
the procedures to use when a noncustodian brings a modification
motion. s
The following excerpt from a recent unpublished opinion il-
lustrates the uncertainty surrounding application of the present
standard and captures the various vague principles that have
emerged since Nice-Peterson:
The party seeking a child custody modification should
submit an affidavit asserting the facts on which the motion
is based. The district court then determines whether peti-
tioner has established a prima facie case by alleging facts
that, if true, would provide sufficient grounds for a modi-
fication. The district court must accept the facts in the
moving party's affidavits as true without independent sub-
stantiation. Minn. Stat. § 518.185 also grants the opposing
party the right to file affidavits, and the court may con-
sider all affidavits in making its determination. As appel-
lant correctly points out, the district court is required to
accept appellant's allegations as true and to disregard any
directly contrary statements in respondent's affidavit; the
court may only "take note of statements in [respondent's]
affidavit that explain the circumstances surrounding the
accusations." If the facts asserted by the moving party are
sufficient to support modification, the district court must
hold an evidentiary hearing. A hearing is strongly en-
couraged when there are allegations of present endan-
41. See Nice-Peterson, 310 N.W.2d at 472. It is this paragraph that triggered the
view that the moving party must establish a prima facie case before a hearing is to
be held.
42. In Jordan v. Jordan, No. C1-94-1331, 1995 WL 6444, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Jan.10, 1995), the panel suggested the following as the reason for the statute: "The
affidavit provides a readily accessible summary for the court, functions as a notice
to the opposing party of what is at issue, and ensures that the specific reasons ad-
vanced by the proponent are called to the court's attention."
43. Note that in Taflin v. Taflin, 366 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985),
the court observed: "The statute, [Minn. Stat. § 518.18] however, does not ... es-
tablish procedural guidelines to be followed when a court is presented with a peti-
tion for modification." Id. (citing Hegerle v. Hegerle, 355 N.W.2d 726, 731
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
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germent to health or emotional well being. In reviewing a
modification petition dismissed without an evidentiary
hearing, we will not reverse absent an abuse of discre-
tion."
The prima facie burden is created: The first piece of creative
construction involving the statute came with the birth of the prima
facie standard.45 This extremely low standard does not appear in
the UMDA and has no support in the commentary to it. The prima
facie standard is inconsistent with the UMDA because it falls to pro-
tect the custodian from unwarranted exposure to an evidentiary
hearing. This burden is so low that it is difficult to imagine that a
trial lawyer, even with a minimal drafting ability, will be unable to
persuade a court to order a hearing.4 As the dispute involving the
black foster family illustrates, a single allegation of abuse is suffi-
cient for some judges to trigger a full custody evidentiary hearing.
Although the court's opinion in Nice-Peterson is commonly
credited with establishing the prima facie standard of proof, 7 no
specific language in the opinion supports this view. In fact, it was
not until May 1985 that the prima facie phrase appears in an appel-
late decision, Pogreba v. Pogreba,4 which is a memorandum opinion
issued by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. In affirming the denial
of a custody modification hearing, the court stated, without expla-
nation or authority other than a citation to Nice-Peterson, that "[t] he
trial court need not grant a hearing on respondent's custody claim
unless he presents affidavits making a prima facie case on the is-
sue.
" 49
The prima facie language in Pogreba was discovered by the edi-
tors of West Publishing Company and appears in the head notes to
44. Skime v. Skime, C1-98-2357, 1999 WL 203830, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
13, 1999) (citations omitted).
45. See Pogreba v. Pogreba, 367 N.W.2d 677, 679 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
46. The prima facie standard is notoriously low in a number of different con-
texts. See Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 165-66 (1st Cir.
1998) (stating that there is a "low threshold showing necessary to establish a prima
facie case"); Chalwest (Holdings) Ltd v. Ellis, 924 F.2d 1011, 1013 (l1th Cir. 1991)
(stating that the prima facie burden is low); Cully v. Milliman & Robertson, Inc.,
20 F. Supp.2d 636, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that the prima facie burden is
"low," requiring only an explanation).
47. See Kulla v. McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175, 180 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Pogreba,
367 N.W.2d at 679.
48. 367 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
49. Id. at 679.
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that opinion in West's Northwest Reporter series. Thus, ever so
quietly and politely was born this low threshold for deciding when a
full custody evidentiary hearing is warranted.
Confirmation of the prima facie burden came in Morey v. Pep-
pin,5' where the Minnesota Supreme Court observed, while reject-
ing a father's request for a custody modification hearing, that:
In any future motion for modification of the award of
child custody in this matter an evidentiary hearing shall be
scheduled if, by affidavits submitted in support of the mo-
tion, the movant makes a prima facie showing of circum-
stances justifying modification pursuant to the provisions
of Minn. Stat. § 518.18 (1984).
Since these decisions, the prima facie burden of proof has
been applied without question to custody modification motions.
In contrast to Minnesota's view, when the Washington Court of
Appeals considered the question of the proof needed before a full
custody hearing is warranted, it established a higher standard.
Washington's view is consistent with the philosophy expressed in
the UMDA, which is to protect the custodial family from unwar-
ranted harassment by the noncustodian. In Roorda v. Roorda,5 4 the
court declared:
There is a strong presumption.., in favor of custodial
continuity and against modification.... We observe a re-
lated policy expressed in the statute of preventing harass-
ment of the custodial parent and providing stability for
the child by imposing a heavy burden on a petitioner,
which must be satisfied before a hearing, is convened.
Another purpose of the statute is to discourage a noncus-
50. See id. at 677.
51. 375 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1985); see also Downey v. Zwigart, 378 N.W.2d 639,
642 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
52. Morey, 375 N.W.2d at 25. This was followed by the Court of Appeals deci-
sion in Axford v. Axford, 402 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("Minn. Stat.
§ 518.18 requires the moving party to present sufficient evidence by affidavit
which, if true, would make a prima facie case for modification.... The affidavit
must make a prima facie case before an evidentiary hearing is required.").
53. See Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Smith v.
Smith, 508 N.W.2d 222, 226 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Abbott v. Abbott, 481 N.W.2d
864, 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
54. 611 P.2d 794, 796 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
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todial parent from filing a petition to modify custody.
The oft-repeated touchstone of any custody decision is
"the best interests of the child".... Litigation over cus-
tody is inconsistent with the child's welfare. "Adequate
cause," therefore, requires something more than prima
facie allegations which, if proven, might permit infe~ences
sufficient to establish grounds for a custody change.
Other state courts that have considered the UMDA have
56adopted the adequate cause standard, which as noted in Roorda,
requires something more than allegations which, if proven, might
permit inferences sufficient to establish grounds for a custody
change. The "adequate cause" standard comports with section 410
of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which states:
A party seeking a temporary custody order or modifica-
tion of a custody decree shall submit together with his
moving papers an affidavit setting forth facts supporting
the requested order or modification and shall give notice,
together with a copy of his affidavit, to other parties to the
proceeding, who may file opposing affidavits. The court
shall deny the motion unless it finds that adequate cause
for hearing the motion is established by the affidavits, in
which case it shall set a date for hearing on an order to
show cause why the requested order or modification
should not be granted.57
Sometimes, but not always, Minnesota's appellate courts have
indicated that trial judges are to weigh relevant negative informa-
tion. Minnesota's courts have been inconsistent when considering
affidavits submitted by a party opposing a modification hearing.
Sometimes the courts have indicated that the opposing affidavits
and other relevant negative information should be considered.
However, at other times the courts have indicated it should not.
On rare occasions the court may attempt to accommodate both
55. Id. at 796 (citation omitted); see also Vasterling, supra note 28, at 933.
56. See Pridgeon v. Superior Court, 655 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Ariz. 1982) (stating that
the court shall deny a motion to modify custody unless it finds that the pleadings
establish adequate cause for hearing the motion); Betzer v. Betzer, 749 S.W.2d
694, 695 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that if the trial court determines that the af-
fidavits fail to establish adequate cause for a hearing, the motion for modification
of custody shall be denied without a hearing).
57. UNIV. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 410, 9A U.L.A. 538 (1998).
2000]
15
Oliphant: Redefining a Statute Out of Existence: Minnesota's View of when a
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
views simultaneously.
The view that the adverse information should be considered
appears most often where the appellate court is justifying a denial
by the trial court of a modification hearing request. For example,
in Krogstad v. Krogstad,59 the court affirmed the denial of a custody
modification request saying the noncustodial parent did not meet
the burden necessary for a "change of custody" hearing. 60 The rul-
ing was based in part on information provided in a court services
study.6' Other information considered by the court suggested that
the children's problems stemmed from their feelings about visiting
their father; that a minor child was sexually abused while in the fa-
ther's care; that the children's behavior was unrelated to the custo-
dian, and that the custodial parent had dealt with the problems
through appropriate counseling.6
Three other decisions are worthy of comment in terms of the
judiciary's willingness to accept adverse information when denying
a full custody evidentiary hearing. In Moyers v. Dobbinsos the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals affirmed a district court denial of an evi-
dentiary hearing, noting that a report from the county child pro-
tection agency failed to substantiate any child abuse.
6 4
In Geibe v. Geiber the court of appeals stated that the trial
judge did not abuse its discretion when denying, without a full evi-
dentiary hearing, a motion to transfer custody of the moving party's
late husband's 17-year-old daughter and to allow visitation with her, • 66
husband's other children. In reaching its decision, the court ana-
lyzed the competing information contained in affidavits submitted
67to the trial judge by all parties to the dispute. The court observed
58. See, e.g., Denk v. Denk, No. C1-92-1471, 1992 WL 383452, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 29, 1992). The court stated, "Minn. Stat. § 518.185(1990) requires that
affidavits be submitted 'together with moving papers' in order to give the oppos-
ing side an opportunity to respond with counteraffidavits." Id. However, the court
then went on to declare that "[a] s the goal is the establishment of a prima facie
case, it is not necessary (or even proper) to consider the allegations of counter-
affidavits. Arguments concerning the relative strength of the affidavits are best
considered at the evidentiary hearing." Id.
59. 388 N.W.2d 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
60. See id. at 383.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. No. C2-99-1082, 1999 WL 1057230 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1999).
64. See id. at *2.
65. 571 N.W.2d 774 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
66. See id. at 780.
67. In part, writes the court:
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that "section 518.185 grants other parties to the proceeding the
right to file opposing affidavits, and the court may consider evi-
dence from sources other than the moving party's affidavits in mak-
ing its determination. "68
Recently, a Court of Appeals panel in C.S.B. v. C.RH.69 applied
the Giebe view. The noncustodian argued unsuccessfully that the
trial judge erred when it accepted untimely affidavits opposing
modification and considered them when deciding not to order a
full hearing.7' The court said that Minnesota Statute section
518.185 permits a trial judge to consider and weigh the opposing
documents submitted by the custodial parent in making its deci-
sion. 72
Ma Donna's [custodial parent's] affidavit characterizes the issue as a con-
flict between a headstrong 17-year-old and a religious, fairly strict mother,
saying that F.G. found Barbara's home an attractive alternative because of
her more liberal lifestyle. She also indicates a belief that Barbara has
promised F.G. a share of Charles's life insurance proceeds for college if
F.G. comes to live with her. Ma Donna denies ever insulting F.G or call-
ing her "too fat," noting that she, as a school nurse, regularly deals with
teenagers with eating disorders. She also denies any intent to cut the
children off from their paternal relatives.
Id. at 776.
68. Id. at 777.
69. No. C4-98-2336, 1999 WL 243641 (Minn. Ct. App. April 27, 1999).
70. See id. at *1-2.
71. See id. at *1.
72. See id. at *2. Observed the court: "We conclude the district court did not
err when it considered Brinker's [custodian] allegation that Hoppe's [noncusto-
dian] own actions are endangering C.R.H.'s emotional health and well-being." Id.
at *1 (citation omitted). In Chafin v. Rude, No. C1-88-543, 1988 WL 56305, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. June 7, 1988), the court, in denying a motion for modification,
considered the custodian's affidavits and supporting documents. The court in
commenting on them, said:
Rude's affidavit and supporting documents suggest that a modification
would not be in the child's best interests. Dr. Jane McNaught, Garrett's
therapist, has recommended that Garrett have no unsupervised contacts
with his mother. Based on her observations and those of the father,
Rude, and those of Garrett's teachers, she concluded that "Garrett's
mother's level of anger and animosity toward Mr. Rude makes it impossi-
ble for her to interact with her son in a way that does not jeopardize
Garrett's emotional functioning." Chafin has provided no affidavit or
documentary evidence that would tend to cast doubt on Dr. McNaught's
conclusion that Chafin's actions were causing or contributing to Garrett's
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Sometimes, but not always, Minnesota's appellate courts have
indicated that trial courts are to disregard negative information.
Confusion over the statutory procedure is evident when several de-
cisions are considered where the appellate panels have indicated
that contrary evidence submitted by the custodial parent must be
disregarded. This view is often found in cases that the appellate
court has decided to reverse and order an evidentiary hearing.
For example, in Thesing v. Thesing, the court ruled that the
trial judge erred in not ordering a modification hearing and stated:
The moving party must submit affidavits setting forth facts
supporting the requested modification. The district court
must grant an evidentiary hearing if the affidavits make
out a prima facie case for modification. In making this
determination, the district court must regard the allega-
tions contained in the moving party's affidavits as true and
disregard contrary 
evidence.
Similarly, in Schuman v. Schuman, 5 where the panel reversed
the trial judge who had refused to set an evidentiary hearing, the
court stated:
The party seeking modification must submit affidavits set-
ting forth facts supporting the requested modification.
The district court may grant an evidentiary hearing if the
affidavits make out a prima facie case for modification. In
making this determination, the district court, assuming
that the allegations contained in the moving party's affi-
davits are true, must disregard contrary evidence.
The suggestion that a trial court must accept a moving party' s
allegations as true first appears in Taflin v. Taflin," and is restated
in Abbott v. Abbott. In ordering a hearing in Abbott, the court
73. No. CO-95-1167, 1995 WL 579256, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 1995).
74. Id. at *1 (citations omitted).
75. No. C3-95-1776, 1996 WL 33093, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1996).
76. Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
77. 366 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). The court, in denying the
nonmovants claim that allegations in the movant's affidavits were insufficient,
stated, "[b]ased on our review of the father's affidavit, we believe that he has al-
leged facts, which if true, would establish a significant change in circumstances
based on emotional endangerment." Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
78. 481 N.W.2d 864, 870 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
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stated:
Although respondent claims that appellant would not
provide a safe and reasonable environment for Jenny, ap-
pellant's prima facie case is not affected by these claims.
Appellant's evidence must be viewed as true, and respon-
dent can offer rebuttal at the evidentiary hearing. Appel-
lant has made a prima facie case that any harm in remov-
ing Jenny from respondent would be outweighed by the
benefits to her. The affidavits submitted in support of ap-
pellant's motion make out a prima facie case for modify-
ing the custody of both girls. Therefore, the trial court
erred in refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing to de-
termine whether custody should be modified.79
Abbott suggests that the unambiguous language in Minnesota
Statute section 518.185, which provides a custodial parent with an
opportunity to counter the noncustodian's allegations, is irrelevant
to a determination of whether a case should go forward. Contra-
dictory information is left to the full evidentiary hearing.8s These
decisions have redefined that portion of the statute allowing oppos-
ing affidavits out of existence.
Sometimes the appellate court has encouraged hearings where
particular allegations are made. Another piece of creative con-
struction of this statute appears in a few opinions where appellate
panels have begun encouraging trial judges to hold evidentiary
hearings because of the nature of the allegations made in the
modification motion. The statute, of course, does not distinguish
between degrees of allegations and does not suggest different stan-
dards for ordering a hearing be to be applied depending on the
type of allegation made.
For example, in Ross v. Ross' the court stated that "[w]e re-
manded [certain cases] for an evidentiary hearing, stressing that
79. Id. at 870.
80. See Harkema v. Harkeman, 474 N.W.2d 10, 13-14 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(finding prima facie showing of endangerment where affidavits alleged statements
by children that their step-parent scared them by "yelling, throwing things, hitting
walls, and driving the car like a maniac"); see also Taflin, 366 N.W.2d at 320 (find-
ing prima facie showing of endangerment where children had lived with their
grandparents for two years and had limited contact with the custodial parent, who
had provided no emotional support and used child support money for her own
needs).
81. 477 N.W.2d at 753, 755 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
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hearings are strongly encouraged where allegations are made of
present endangerment to a child's health or emotional well be-
ing.",8
VI. CONCLUSION
The law surrounding the treatment courts should afford com-
peting affidavits prepared pursuant to Minnesota Statute section
518.185 is confused, inconsistent and in need of repair. The claim
involving the foster family, discussed earlier in this article, is a case-
in-point. The case took more than four months and many hours of
work before it was concluded. Both informal and formal discovery
confirmed the facts contained in the foster family's sworn state-
ments submitted to the judge at the outset of the dispute. As most
knew by the time of the initial hearing, the child had manufactured
a claim to satisfy a perceived request from her blood relatives that
she should now live with them. The matter was dismissed with
prejudice on the day of the hearing pursuant to an agreement with
83the noncustodian's attorney.
In addition to the psychological devastation the foster family
endured because of the claim, they also incurred legal costs, even
with pro bono representation. They were forced to pay filing fees
and share in the costs of the guardian ad litem, who was appointed
by the court without the family' s involvement or consent. But for
the pro bono effort, and an agreement regarding the discovery
procedures, the costs for this legal battle would be estimated in ex-
cess of $7,500. Worse, their lives are forever scarred.
This then is Minnesota's legal system at work. The prima facie
burden fails to adequately protect a child's need for stability or a
custodial family from exploitation. The burden for ordering a
hearing leaves unchecked power in the hands of trial courts and
acts as a minor barrier to an experienced trial lawyer representing
the noncustodian. This approach to custody modification is not
consistent with the UMDA.
To repair the damage and reduce the confusion, the legisla-
ture should address Minnesota Statute section 518.185 and modify
the statute along the lines of the following suggestions.
First, legislation should make it clear that a custody modifica-
82. Id. at 756 (citations omitted).
83. It was agreed the noncustodial parent could visit with the child under su-
pervision once a month.
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tion is not to be ordered absent adequate cause. Second, adequate
cause should be defined as requiring something more than allega-
tions, which, if proven, might permit inferences sufficient to estab-
lish grounds for custody change. Third, legislation should direct
that trial courts weigh and consider all of the relevant facts con-
tained in all of the affidavits submitted. Fourth, trial courts should
be cautioned against assuming the falsity of any affidavits submitted
to them. Fifth, trial courts should be directed to give equal weight
to all claims. Sixth, if a trial court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that adequate cause for a hearing is warranted, it should
be directed to set one up. Seventh, if a trial court judge is uncer-
tain about whether to order a hearing, the judge should not order
one. Eighth, if a modification hearing is ordered, the trial court
should be required to issue specific findings of fact justifying the
decision. Ninth, if a modification hearing is not ordered, the trial
court should be required to issue a short explanation justifying the
result. Tenth, the Minnesota Supreme Court should decide
whether the appellate standard for reviewing a challenge to grant-
ing or denying an evidentiary hearing is de novo or abuse of discre-
tion.
With these changes, reasonable certainty in the procedures to
follow at the outset of a modification proceeding will be restored
and the original philosophy of maximizing finality of custody deci-
sions, which was intended by the drafters of the UMDA, will be re-
turned to Minnesota law. Courts will have far more guidance than
they have today when handling these difficult issues and the results
of modification motions will be far more predictable by the legal
community. Everyone will benefit!
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